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Abstract
Employing a logic program approach, this paper focuses on applying preferential reasoning to theory revision, both by means of
preferences among existing theory rules, and by means of preferences on the possible abductive extensions to the theory. And, in
particular, how to prefer among plausible abductive explanations justifying observations.
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1. Introduction
Logic program semantics and procedures have been used to characterize preferences among the rules of a the-
ory [5]. Whereas the combination of such rule preferences with program updates and the updating of the preference
rules themselves [4] have been tackled, a crucial ingredient has been missing, namely the consideration of abductive
extensions to a theory, and the integration of revisable preferences among such extensions. The latter further issue is
the main subject of this paper.
We take a theory expressed as a logic program under stable model semantics, already infused with preferences
between rules, and we add a set of abducibles constituting possible extensions to the theory, governed by conditional
priority rules amongst preferred extensions. Moreover, we cater for minimally revising the preferential priority theory
itself, so that a strict partial order is always enforced, even as actual preferences are modified by new incoming
information. This is accomplished by means of a diagnosis theory on revisable preferences over abducibles, and its
attending procedure.
First we supply some epistemological background to the problem at hand. Then we introduce our preferential
abduction framework, in the context of a specific logic program approach, and proceed to apply it to exploratory
data analysis. Next we consider, within the same approach, the diagnosis and revision of preferences, theory and
method, and illustrate it on the data exploration example. Finally, we exact general epistemic remarks about the
general approach.
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(I) The theoretical notions of preference and rationality with which we are most familiar are those of the econo-
mists’. Economic preference is a comparative choice between alternative outcomes whereby a rational (economic)
agent is one whose expressed preferences over a set of outcomes exhibits the structure of a complete pre-order.
However, actual preferences may change. Viewing this phenomena as a comparative choice, however, entails that
there are meta-level preferences whose outcomes are various preference rankings of beliefs and that an agent chooses
a change in preference based upon a comparative choice between the class of first-order preferences [6]. But this is
an unlikely model of actual change in preference, since we often evaluate changes—including whether to abandon
a change in preference–based upon items we learn after a change in preference is made. Hence, a realistic model
of preference change will not be one that is couched exclusively in decision theoretic terms. Rather, when a conflict
occurs in updating beliefs by new information, the possible items for revision should include both the set of conflicting
beliefs and a reified preference relation underlying the belief set. The reason for adopting this strategy is that we do
not know, a priori, what is more important—our data or our theory. Rather, as Isaac Levi has long advocated [14],
rational inquiry is guided by pragmatic considerations not a priori constraints on rational belief. On Levi’s view, all
justification for change in belief is pragmatic in the sense that justification for belief fixation and change are rooted
in strategies for promoting the goals of a given inquiry. Setting these parameters for a particular inquiry fixes the
theoretical constraints for the inquiring agent. The important point to stress here is that there is no conflict between
theoretical and practical reasoning on Levi’s approach, since the prescriptions of Levi’s theory are not derived from
minimal principles of rational consistency or coherence [14].
In [19], arguments are given as to how epistemic entrenchment can be explicitly expressed as preferential reasoning.
And, moreover, how preferences can be employed to determine belief revisions, or, conversely, how belief contractions
can lead to the explicit expression of preferences.
[6] provides a stimulating survey of opportunities and problems in the use of preferences, reliant on AI techniques.
(II) Suppose your scientific theory predicts an observation, o, but you in fact observe ¬o. The problem of carrying
out a principled revision of your theory in light of the observation ¬o is surprisingly difficult. One issue that must
be confronted is what the principle objects of change are. If theories are simply represented as sets of sentences and
prediction is represented by material implication, then we are confronted with Duhem’s Problem [7]: If a theory entails
an observation for which we have disconfirming evidence, logic alone won’t tell you which among the conjunction
of accepted hypotheses to change in order to restore consistency. The serious issue raised by Duhem’s problem is
whether disconfirming evidence targets the items of a theory in need of revision in a principled manner.
The AGM [1] conception of belief change differs to Duhem’s conception of the problem in two important respects.
First, whereas the item of change on Duhem’s account is a set of sentences, the item of change on the AGM conception
is a belief state, represented as a pair consisting of a logically closed set of sentences (a belief set) and a selection
function. What remains in common is what Sven Hansson [11] has called the input-assimilating model of revision,
whereby the object of change is a set of sentences, the input item is a particular sentence, and the output is a new
set of sentences. But one insight to emerge is that the input objects for change may not be single sentences, but a
sentence-measure pair [15], where the value of the measure represents the entrenchment of the sentence and thereby
encodes the ranking of this sentence in the replacement belief set [15,19,20]. But once we acknowledge that items
of change are not beliefs simpliciter but belief and order coordinates, then there are two potential items for change:
the acceptance or rejection of a belief and the change of that belief in the ordering. Hence, implicitly, the problem of
preference change appears here as well.
(III) Computer science has adopted logic as its general foundational tool, while Artificial Intelligence AI has made
viable the proposition of turning logic into a bona fide computer programming language. At the same time, AI has de-
veloped logic beyond the confines of monotonic cumulativity, typical of the precise, complete, endurable, condensed,
and closed mathematical domains, in order to open it up to the non-monotonic real-world domain of imprecise, in-
complete, contradictory, arguable, revisable, distributed, and evolving knowledge. In short, AI has added dynamics to
erstwhile statics. Indeed, classical logic has been developed to study well-defined, consistent, and unchanging math-
ematical objects. It thereby acquired a static character. AI needs to deal with knowledge in flux, and less than perfect
conditions, by means of more dynamic forms of logic. Too many things can go wrong in an open non-mathematical
world, some of which we don’t even suspect. In the real world, any setting is too complex already for us to define
exhaustively each time. We have to allow for unforeseen exceptions to occur, based on new incoming information.
588 P. Dell’Acqua, L.M. Pereira / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 586–601Thus, instead of having to make sure or prove that some condition is not present, we may assume it is not (the Closed
World Assumption—CWA), on condition that we are prepared to accept subsequent information to the contrary, i.e.
we may assume a more general rule than warranted, but must henceforth be prepared to deal with arising exceptions.
Much of this has been the focus of research in logic programming (LP), a field of AI which uses logic directly as
a programming language,1 and provides specific implementation methods and efficient working systems to do so.2
Logic programming is at present a staple implementation vehicle for logic approaches to AI.
Logic programs find their origin in the theorem proving research efforts begun early with AI, in the 1950s. In the
early 70s, Kowalski and Khuener’s SLD-resolution provided a linear resolution method for the Horn clause fragment
of predicate logic. Negation as failure and its SLDNF-resolution, incorporated in the Prolog programming language,
subsequently gave way to the more declarative and general default negation, incorporated into nowadays Stable Model
and Well-Founded Semantics, and to the general use of LP for many varieties of non-monotonic reasoning it affords.
The success of the enterprise has rested too on the use of the LP arrow in rules to denote not material implication but
inference, thereby avoiding the combinatorics of contrapositives, and using an arrow’s direction as pragmatic infor-
mation. Furthermore, besides default negation, the introduction of other forms of non-classical negation into LP, has
ameliorated its use as a vehicle for representing and reasoning about knowledge, including making abductions, cop-
ing with paraconsistency, performing belief revision, pursuing hypothetical and default reasoning, enacting knowledge
updating, doing meta-reasoning, and enabling preferential theory revision.
The power of LP in dealing with such rational functionalities relies on its sufficiently encompassing rich rep-
resentational ability to address them, albeit lacking in full generality, and in their computational handling through
sophisticated implemented systems. It is our conviction, then, that addressing the issue of preferential theory revision
within the purview of LP provides us with a useful formal vehicle to explore not only the epistemological aspects
involved but also the attending computational ones, and, moreover, with a test-bed for their exploration. And this we
will proceed to do next.
2. Framework
2.1. Language
Let L be a first order language. A domain literal in L is a domain atom A or its default negation notA, the latter
expressing that the atom is false by default (CWA). A domain rule in L is a rule of the form:
A ← L1, . . . ,Lt (t  0)
where A is a domain atom and L1, . . . ,Lt are domain literals. To express preference information, L contains priority
rules. Let N = {nr1, . . . , nrk } be a name set containing a unique name for every domain rule in L. Given a domain
rule r , we write nr to indicate its name. A priority atom is an atom of the form nr < nu, where {nr, nu} ⊆ N .3 nr < nu
means that rule r is preferred to rule u. We assume that names in N do not include “<” itself. A priority rule in L is
a rule of the form:
nr < nu ← L1, . . . ,Lt (t  0)
where nr < nu is a priority atom and every Li (1 i  t ) is a domain literal or a priority literal.
We use the following convention. Given a rule r of the form L0 ← L1, . . . ,Lt , we write H(r) to indicate L0, B(r)
to indicate the conjunction L1, . . . ,Lt . We write B+(r) to indicate the conjunction of all positive literals in B(r), and
B−(r) to indicate the conjunction of all negated literals in B(r). When t = 0 we write the rule r simply as L0.
Let A⊆ L be a set of domain atoms, called abducibles. Abducibles may be thought of as hypotheses that can be
used to extend the current theory of the agent, in order to provide hypothetical solutions or possible explanations for
given queries.
1 Cf. [13] for the foundations, [3] for a relevant technical background to this paper, and [16] for philosophical underpinnings.
2 For a most advanced system, incorporating recent theory and implementation developments, see the XSB system at: http://xsb.sourceforge.net/.
3 In order to establish the preferred abductive stable models (cf. Definition 6), we require the relation induced by < to be a well-founded, strict
partial ordering on N.
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of abducibles AP , without rules in P . A 2-valued interpretation M of L is any set of literals from L that satisfies the
condition that, for any atom A, precisely one of the literals A or notA belongs to M . We say that an interpretation M
satisfies a conjunction of literals L1, . . . ,Lt , and write M |= L1, . . . ,Lt , if every literal Li in the conjunction belongs
to M .
2.2. Declarative semantics
In the remaining of this section we let P be a program over L, AP the set of abducibles of P , and M an interpreta-
tion of L. We write least(P ) to indicate the least model of P . We adopt the following two definitions from [10], and
Definitions 4 and 5 from [4].
Definition 1. The set of default assumptions of P with respect to M is:
Default(P,M) = {notA: r ∈ P such that H(r) = A and M |= B(r)}.
Definition 2. M is a stable model of P iff M = least(P ∪ Default(P,M)).
Definition 3. Let  ⊆AP . M is an abductive stable model with hypotheses  of P iff:
M = least(P+ ∪ Default(P+,M)), where P+ = P ∪ .
Note that the abducibles in AP are defined false by default whenever they are not abduced. Given a program P , to
compute which of its abductive stable models are preferred according to the priority relation <, we remove (from the
program) all the unsupported rules together with the less preferred rules defeated by the head of some more preferred
one, in a priority rule. Unsupported rules are those whose head is true in the model but whose body is defeated by the
model, i.e. some of its default negated atoms are false in it.
Definition 4. The set of unsupported rules of P and M is:
Unsup(P,M) = {r ∈ P : M |= H(r),M |= B+(r) and M |= B−(r)}.
Definition 5. Unpref (P,M) is a set of unpreferred rules of P and M iff:
Unpref (P,M) = least(Unsup(P,M)∪Q), where
Q = {r ∈ P : ∃u ∈ (P − Unpref (P,M)) such that M |= nu < nr, M |= B+(u),
and
[
not H(u) ∈ B−(r) or (not H(r) ∈ B−(u), M |= B(r))]}.
A rule r is unpreferred if it is unsupported or there exists a more preferred rule u (which is not itself unpreferred)
such that the positive literals in B(u) hold, and r is defeated by u or r attacks (i.e., attempts to defeat) u. Note that
only domain rules can be unpreferred since it is required that M |= nu < nr holds, where nu and nr are names of
domain rules.
The following definition introduces the notion of preferred abductive stable model. Given a program P and a set
 of hypotheses, a preferred abductive stable model with hypotheses  of P is a stable model of the program that
contains all the hypotheses in , and all those rules in P that are not unpreferred.
Definition 6. Let  ⊆ AP and M an abductive stable model with hypotheses  of P . M is a preferred abductive
stable model with hypotheses  of P iff:
1. if M |= nr1 < nr2 , then M |= nr2 < nr1 ;
2. if M |= nr1 < nr2 and M |= nr2 < nr3 , then M |= nr1 < nr3 ;
3. M = least(P+ − Unpref (P+,M)∪ Default(P+,M)), with P+ = P ∪ .
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contains only domain rules and priority rules (that is, there are no abducibles), the semantics reduces to the Preferential
semantics of Brewka and Eiter [5]. If integrity constraints are introduced, this semantics generalizes to the Updates and
Preferences semantics of Alferes and Pereira [4], which extends updatable logic programs with updatable preferences.
Our semantics takes the latter, without formally addressing updating, and complements it with modifiable abducibles.
Definition 7. An abductive explanation for a query G is any set  ⊆ AP of hypotheses such that there exists a
preferred abductive stable model M with hypotheses  of P for which M |= G.
A program may have several abductive explanations for a query G.
3. Preferring abducibles
In our framework we defined the preference relation over domain rules. A possible question is: Can we also express
preferences over abducibles? Being able to do so will allow us to compare the competing explanations for an observed
behaviour. The evaluation of alternative explanations is one of the central problems of abduction. Indeed, an abductive
problem of a reasonable size (for example in diagnosis) may have a combinatorial explosion of possible explanations
to handle. Thus, it is important to generate only the explanations that are relevant for the problem at hand. Several
proposals about how to evaluate competing explanations have been proposed. Some of them involve a “global” cri-
terion against which each explanation as a whole can be evaluated. A general drawback of those approaches is that
global criteria are generally domain independent and computationally expensive. An alternative to global criteria for
competing alternative assumptions is to allow the theory to contain rules encoding domain specific information about
the likelihood that a particular assumption is true. In our approach we can express preferences among abducibles to
discard the unwanted assumptions in context. Preferences over alternative abducibles can be coded into cycles over
default negation, and preferring a rule will break the cycle in favour of one abducible or another. In our framework, we
employ the notion of expectation4 to express the preconditions for assuming an abducible a. If we have an expectation
for a, and we do not have an expectation for not a, then a can be confirmed, and therefore a can be assumed.
To express preference criteria among abducibles, we introduce the language L∗. A relevance atom is one of the
form a 
 b, where a and b are abducibles. a 
 b means that the abducible a is more relevant than the abducible b.
A relevance rule is a rule of the form:
a 
 b ← L1, . . . ,Lt (t  0)
where a 
 b is a relevance atom and every Li (1 i  t ) is a domain literal or a relevance literal. Let L∗ be a language
consisting of domain rules and relevance rules.
Example 1. Consider a situation where an agent Claire drinks either tea or coffee (but not both). Suppose that Claire
prefers coffee over tea when sleepy. This situation can be represented by a program Q over L∗ with the set of ab-
ducibles AQ = {tea, coffee}:
Q =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
drink ← tea
drink ← coffee
expect(tea)
expect(coffee)
expect_not(coffee) ← blood_pressure_high
coffee 
 tea ← sleepy
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
4 The notion of expectation here is not to be confused with the decision theoretic notion of ‘expectation’, i.e., the notion of ‘expected utility’.
Expected utility has to do with expectations for the values of some set of outcomes or other, while expectation, within non-monotonic logic,
concerns beliefs about the world [8].
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tea ← not coffee and coffee ← not tea
expressing that the abducibles tea and coffee exclude one another. Having the notion of expectation allows one to
express the preconditions for an expectation or otherwise about an assumption a, and express which possible expec-
tations are confirmed (or go through) in a given situation. If the preconditions do not hold, then expectation a cannot
be confirmed, and therefore a will not be assumed. For example, the rules:
expect(tea) ← have_tea and expect(coffee) ← have_coffee
express that one has an expectation for tea and coffee if he has them. By means of expect_not one can express
situations where one does not expect something. The rule
expect_not(coffee) ← blood_pressure_high
states not to expect coffee if one has high blood pressure. In this case, coffee will not be confirmed or go through
because of the contrary expectation arising as well (and therefore tea will be assumed).
The following definition exploits the relevancy relation 
 of a program Q to distinguish which of its abductive
stable models are relevant.
Definition 8. Let Q be a program over L∗ with set of abducibles AQ and M an interpretation of L∗. Let  ⊆AQ. M
is a relevant abductive stable model of Q with hypothesis  iff:
1. for every x, y ∈AQ, if M |= x 
 y then M |= y 
 x;
2. for every x, y, z ∈AQ, if M |= x 
 y and M |= y 
 z, then M |= x 
 z;
3. M = least(Q+ ∪ Default(Q+,M)), with Q+ = Q∪ ;
4.  is the empty set or a singleton  = {a}, for some a ∈AQ;
5. if  = {a}, then M |= expect(a) and M |= expect_not(a);
6. if  = {a}, then there exists no relevance rule r in Q such that:
• H(r) is x 
 a,
• M |= H(r),
• M |= expect(x) and M |= expect_not(x).
Letting  be the empty set or a singleton (condition 4 above) guarantees that the abducibles in AQ are alternative
in the sense that only one can be assumed. Note that for simplicity of exposition, we consider  to be a singleton. This
can be generalized to a set of abducibles, and the preference order can be adapted to one among sets. As required by
a preference relation, it is natural to demand that the relevancy relation be a strict partial order (conditions 1 and 2).
Condition 3 requires interpretation M to be an abductive stable model with hypotheses . The notion of expectation
is incorporated directly into the definition of relevant abductive stable model by condition 5. Finally, condition 6
guarantees that there exists no abducible x (which can be confirmed) more relevant than a.
Example 2. Let Q be the program of Example 1. Q has two alternatives explanations 1 = {coffee} and 2 = {tea}
for the query drink. In fact, Q has two relevant abductive stable models:
M1 =
{
expect(tea), expect(coffee), coffee,drink} with hypotheses 1,
M2 =
{
expect(tea), expect(coffee), tea,drink} with hypotheses 2.
for which M1 |= drink and M2 |= drink. The number of models reduces to one if we add sleepy to Q. In this case,
coffee being an abducible more relevant than tea and consequently the only relevant model of Q is M1 ∪ {sleepy}.
The following syntactical transformation maps programs over L∗ into programs over L, and thereby gives us a
proof procedure for the language L∗.
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abducibles AP = {abduce} is obtained as follows:
1. P contains all the domain rules in Q;
2. for every ai ∈AQ, P contains the domain rule:
confirm(ai) ← expect(ai),not expect_not(ai);
3. for every ai ∈AQ, P contains the domain rule:
ai ← abduce,not a1, . . . ,not ai−1,not ai+1, . . . ,not am, confirm(ai) (ri);
4. for every relevance rule r in Q, P contains a priority rule obtained from r by replacing every relevance atom
ai 
 aj in r with the priority atom nri<nrj .
To take into consideration expectations, the transformation Σ adds (step 2) a rule defining the notion of confirma-
tion for every abducible ai in AQ. Then, Σ codes the alternative abducibles of AQ into mutually defeating cycles
over default negation (step 3), and preferring a rule (step 4) will break the cycle in favour of one abducible or another.
Note that every rule added at step 3 contains in its body the abducible abduce and confirm(ai). The role of abduce is
to enact the assumption of one of the alternative assumptions needed to prove the query,5 while the role of confirm(ai)
is to require that the expectations for ai are satisfied. It is easy to see that Σ(Q) is a program over the language L.
Example 3. Let Q be the program of Example 1. The transformation Σ maps Q into the program P with abducibles
AP = {abduce}:
P =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
drink ← tea
drink ← coffee
expect(tea)
expect(coffee)
expect_not(coffee) ← blood_pressure_high
coffee ← abduce,not tea, confirm(coffee) (1)
tea ← abduce,not coffee, confirm(tea) (2)
confirm(tea) ← expect(tea),not expect_not(tea)
confirm(coffee) ← expect(coffee),not expect_not(coffee)
1 < 2 ← sleepy
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
The role of the abducible abduce is to enact the assumption of one of the alternative assumptions tea or coffee needed
to prove drink. The rules (1) and (2) code the alternative assumptions tea and coffee into cycles over negation. Rule (1)
says that coffee can be assumed if abduce has been abduced, tea is not assumed, and coffee is confirmed. The last rule
in P is a priority rule stating that rule (1) is preferable to rule (2) if sleepy holds. P has two preferred abductive stable
models with hypotheses  = {abduce}:
M1 =
{
abduce, confirm(tea), confirm(coffee), expect(tea), expect(coffee), coffee,drink},
M2 =
{
abduce, confirm(tea), confirm(coffee), expect(tea), expect(coffee), tea,drink}.
The number of preferred abductive stable models reduces to one if sleepy holds. In that case, the unique preferred
abductive stable model is:
M3 =
{
abduce, confirm(tea), confirm(coffee), expect(tea), expect(coffee), coffee,drink, sleepy,1 < 2}.
5 If the query holds without making assumptions, then abduce is not abduced and none of the alternative assumptions in AQ can be assumed.
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Given an interpretation M , we write M̂ to indicate the interpretation obtained from M by adding the abducible
abduce if M contains at least one abducible a ∈ AQ, the domain atom confirm(a) for any a ∈ AQ such that M |=
expect(a) and M |= expect_not(a), and by replacing every relevance atom of the form ai 
 aj in M with nri < nrj .
Theorem 1. Let Q be a program over L∗ with abducibles AQ and P = Σ(Q). Then, M̂ is a preferred abductive
stable model with hypotheses 1 of P iff M is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q, where
either
(a) 1 = 2 = {}, or
(b) 1 = {abduce} and 2 = {a}, for some a ∈AQ.
4. Exploratory data analysis
Another application of expressing preferences over abducibles is that of exploratory data analysis, which aims
at suggesting a pattern for further inquiry, and contributes to the conceptual and qualitative understanding of a phe-
nomenon. Assume that a unexpected phenomenon, x, is observed by an agent Bob, and that Bob has three possible
hypotheses (abducibles) a, b, c, capable of explaining it. In exploratory data analysis, after observing some new facts,
we abduce explanations and explore them to check predicted values against observations. Though there may be more
than one convincing explanation, we abduce the most plausible candidates. The next example illustrates explanatory
data analysis.
Example 4. Let the program Q over L∗, with abducibles AQ = {a, b, c}, be the theory of agent Bob:
Q =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ← a
x ← b
x ← c
expect(a)
expect(b)
expect(c)
a 
 c ← not e
b 
 c ← not e
b 
 a ← d
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where the meaning is as follows:
x—the car does not start,
a—the battery has problems,
b—the ignition is damaged,
c—there is no gasoline in the car,
d—the car’s radio works,
e—the wife has used the car, and
exp—test if the car’s radio works.
Q has two relevant abductive stable models capable of explaining observation x:
M1 =
{
expect(a), expect(b), expect(c), a 
 c, b 
 c, a, x} with hypothesis 1 = {a},
M2 =
{
expect(a), expect(b), expect(c), a 
 c, b 
 c, b, x} with hypothesis 2 = {b}.
In this example, we have only a partial relevancy theory over abducibles. Thus, we cannot select exactly one abducible
(i.e., one model), as it were the case had we a complete relevancy relation over all abducibles inAQ. To prefer between
a and b, one can perform some experiment exp to obtain confirmation (by observing the environment) about the most
plausible hypothesis. To do so, we can employ active rules that are rules of the form:
L1, . . . ,Lt ⇒ α : A
where L1, . . . ,Lt are domain literals, and α : A is an action literal. This rule states to update the theory of an agent α
with A if its body L1, . . . ,Lt is satisfied in all relevant abductive stable models. For example, we can add the following
rules (where env plays the role of the environment) to the theory Q of Bob:{
choose ← a
choose ← b
}
together with
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
a ⇒ Bob : chosen
b ⇒ Bob : chosen
choose ⇒ Bob : (not chosen ⇒ env : exp)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ .
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discover the correct one. Bob chooses some hypothesis if a or b hold:
choose ← a,
choose ← b.
With this knowledge, Bob still has two relevant abductive stable models: M3 = M1 ∪ {choose} and M4 = M2 ∪
{choose}. As choose holds in both models, the last active rule is triggerable. When triggered, it will add (at the next
state) the active rule not chosen ⇒ env : exp to the theory of Bob, and, if not chosen holds, Bob will perform the
experiment exp. The first two active rules are needed to prevent Bob from performing exp when Bob has chosen one
of the abducibles.
5. Revising relevancy relations
The relevancy relation 
 is required by Definition 8 to be a strict partial order. Relevancy relations are subject to be
modified when new information is brought to the knowledge of an individual, or aggregated when we need to represent
and reason about the simultaneous relevancy relations of several individuals. The resulting relevancy relation may not
be a strict partial order and must therefore be revised. This section investigates the problem of revising relevancy
relations by means of declarative debugging. Mark that, more generally, the conditions on the preference order need
not be those of a strict partial order, but may be any other desirable conditions. In any case, the resulting possible
revisions provide as many alternative coherent choices on the preferences actually adopted as a result of any single
revision.
Example 5. Let 
1 and 
2 be two relevancy relations. Suppose that 
1 and 
2 are combined by boolean composition,
that is, 
 = 
1 ∪ 
2. Clearly, 
 is not a strict partial order since antisymmetric and transitivity are not necessarily
preserved. Consider the following program Q over L∗ with abducibles AQ = {a, b, c}:
Q =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ← a
x ← b
x ← c
expect(a)
expect(b)
expect(c)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∪
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
u¯ 
 v¯ ← u¯ 
1 v¯
u¯ 
 v¯ ← u¯ 
2 v¯
a 
1 b
b 
1 c
b 
2 a
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where u¯ and v¯ are variables ranging over the abducibles in AQ. The program Q does not have any relevant abductive
stable model since 
 is not a strict partial order and therefore conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 8 are not met.
With the aim of revising relevancy relations, we introduce the language L+ extending L∗ to contain integrity
constraints. The latter are rules of the form:
⊥ ← L1, . . . ,Lt (t  0)
where ⊥ is a domain atom denoting contradiction, and L1, . . . ,Lt are domain or relevance literals. Integrity constraints
are rules that enforce some condition, and in this case they take the form of denials. Domain rules are distinct from
integrity constraints and must not be expressed as denials. In domain rules, it is of crucial importance which atom
occurs in their head. The language L+ consists of domain rules, relevance rules, and integrity constraints. In L+ there
are no abducibles, and therefore its meaning is characterized in terms of stable models. Given a program T over L+
and a literal L, we write T |= L if L is true in every stable model of T . The program T is contradictory if T |= ⊥.
Clearly, programs over L+ are liable to be contradictory because of the integrity constraints.
We introduce now the notion of diagnosis, adapted from [17], to handle relevancy relations. Given a contradictory
program T , to revise its contradiction (⊥) we have to modify T by adding and removing rules. In this framework, the
diagnostic process reduces to finding such rules. To specify which rules in T may be added or removed, we assume
given a set C of predicate symbols of L+. C induces a partition of T into two disjoint parts: a changeable one Tc and
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atoms not belonging to C. The part Tc is the one subject to the diagnosis process.
Definition 10. Let T be a program and C a set of predicate symbols in L+. Let D be a pair 〈U,I 〉, where U is a set
of atoms whose predicate symbols are in C and I ⊆ Tc. Then D is a diagnosis for T iff (T − I ) ∪ U |= ⊥. The pair
〈{ }, { }〉 is called the empty diagnosis.
Intuitively, a diagnosis specifies the rules to be added and removed from the changeable part of T to revise its
contradiction ⊥. In order to minimize the number of changes we consider minimal diagnoses.
Definition 11. Let T be a program and D = 〈U,I 〉 a diagnosis for T . Then, D is a minimal diagnosis for T iff there
exists no diagnosis D2 = 〈U2, I2〉 for T such that (U2 ∪ I2) ⊂ (U ∪ I ).
The following example illustrates the notion of minimal diagnosis. To check whether or not the relevancy relation

 of a program is a strict partial order, we need to express (within the program itself) the properties required for 
.
Example 6. Consider the program Q of Example 5. To express that the relevancy relation of Q is a strict partial order,
we add to Q the rules:
T = Q∪
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⊥ ← u¯ 
 u¯
⊥ ← u¯ 
 v¯, v¯ 
 u¯
⊥ ← u¯ 
 v¯, v¯ 
 z¯,not u¯ 
 z¯
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
where u¯, v¯, and z¯ are variables ranging over the abducibles in AQ. Since a 
 b and b 
 a belong to every stable model
of T , we conclude ⊥ and thus engender a contradiction. To revise T we need to identify its stable and changeable
part. Let C be the set {
1,
2}. This means that only the relevancy relations 
1 and 
2 are subject to revision:
Tc =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
a 
1 b
b 
1 c
b 
2 a
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ and Ts = T − Tc.
T admits three minimal diagnoses: D1 = 〈{}, {a 
1 b}〉, D2 = 〈{}, {b 
1 c, b 
2 a}〉 and D3 = 〈{a 
1 c}, {b 
2 a}〉.
To compute the minimal diagnoses of a contradictory program T , we employ the contradiction removal method
presented in [17], adapted here to handle relevancy relations. The contradiction removal method is based on the idea
of revising (to false) some of the default atoms notA. A default atom notA can be revised to false by simply adding
A to T . According to [17] the default literals notA that are allowed to change their truth value are those for which
there exists no rule in T defining A. Such literals are called revisable.
Definition 12. Let T be a program over L+. An atom A = ⊥ is a revisable of T iff there is no rule defining A in T .
Definition 13. Let T be a program over L+ and V a set of revisables of T . A set Z ⊆ V is a revision of T iff
T ∪Z |= ⊥.
Example 7. Consider the contradictory program T = Ts ∪ Tc:
Ts =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
⊥ ← a, a′
⊥ ← b
⊥ ← d,notf
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ and Tc =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
a ← not b,not c
a′ ← not d
c ← e
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
with revisables V = {b, d, e, f }. Intuitively the literals not b, not d and not e are true by CWA, entailing a and a′, and
hence ⊥ via the first integrity constraint. The revisions of T are {e}, {d,f }, {e,f } and {d, e, f }, where the first two
are minimal.
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contradiction removal.
Definition 14. Let T be a program over L+ and C a set of predicate symbols in L+. The transformation Γ that maps
T into a program T ′ is obtained by applying to T the following two operations:
• Add not incorrect(A ← Body) to the body of each rule A ← Body in Tc.
• Add the rule p(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) ← uncovered(p(x¯1, . . . , x¯n)) for each predicate symbol p with arity n in C, where
x¯1, . . . , x¯n are variables.
We assume the predicate symbols incorrect and uncovered do not occur in T . The following result states the
correctness of Γ .
Theorem 2. Let T be a program over L+ and L a literal. Then T |= L iff Γ (T ) |= L.
We illustrate now the use of revisions for contradiction removal.
Example 8. Let T be the program of Example 6. Then, the program Γ (T ) is:
Γ (T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ← a
x ← b
x ← c
expect(a)
expect(b)
expect(c)
u¯ 
 v¯ ← u¯ 
1 v¯
u¯ 
 v¯ ← u¯ 
2 v¯
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∪
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⊥ ← u¯ 
 u¯
⊥ ← u¯ 
 v¯, v¯ 
 u¯
⊥ ← u¯ 
 v¯, v¯ 
 z¯,not u¯ 
 z¯
a 
1 b ← not incorrect(a 
1 b)
b 
1 c ← not incorrect(b 
1 c)
b 
2 a ← not incorrect(b 
2 a)
u¯ 
1 v¯ ← uncovered(u¯ 
1 v¯)
u¯ 
2 v¯ ← uncovered(u¯ 
2 v¯)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
The minimal revisions of Γ (T ) with respect to the revisables of the form incorrect(.) and uncovered(.) are:
Z1 =
{
incorrect(a 
1 b)
}
,
Z2 =
{
incorrect(b 
1 c), incorrect(b 
2 a)
}
,
Z3 =
{
uncovered(a 
1 c), incorrect(b 
2 a)
}
.
It is easy to see that Z3, for instance, is a revision of Γ (T ) since the unique stable model M of Γ (T )∪Z3 is:
M = {a 
 c, a 
 b, b 
 c, a 
1 c, a 
1 b, b 
1 c, expect(a), expect(b), expect(c),uncovered(a 
1 c),
incorrect(b 
2 a)
}
and M |= ⊥.
The following result relates the minimal diagnoses of a program T with the minimal revisions of Γ (T ).
Theorem 3. Let T be a program over L+. The pair D = 〈U,I 〉 is a diagnosis for T iff
Z = {uncovered(A): A ∈ U}∪ {incorrect(A ← Body): A ← Body ∈ I}
is a revision of Γ (T ), where the revisables are literals of the form incorrect(.) and uncovered(.). Furthermore, D is
a minimal diagnosis iff Z is a minimal revision.
To compute the minimal diagnosis of a program T we consider the transformed program Γ (T ) and compute its
minimal revisions. An algorithm for computing minimal revisions in such logic programs is given in [17].
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We have shown that, following a logic program approach, preferences and priorities (they too are a form of prefer-
ential expressiveness) can enact choices amongst rules and amongst abducibles, which are dependent on the specifics
of situations, all in the context of theories and theory extensions expressible as logic programs. As a result, using avail-
able transformations provided here and elsewhere [2], these programs are executable by means of publicly available
state-of-the-art systems [12]. In [2], we furthermore have shown how preferences can be integrated with knowledge
updates, and how they fall too under the purview of updating, again in the context of logic programs. Preferences
about preferences are also adumbrated therein.
We have employed the two-valued Stable Models semantics to provide meaning to our logic programs, but we could
just as well have employed the three-valued Well-Founded Semantics [9] for a more skeptical preferential reasoning.
Also, we need not necessarily insist on a strict partial order for preferences, but have indicated that different condi-
tions can be provided. The possible alternative revisions, required to satisfy the conditions, impart a non-monotonic or
defeasible reading of the preferences given initially. Such a generalization permits us to go beyond just a foundational
view of preferences, and allows us to admit a coherent view as well, inasmuch several alternative consistent stable
models may obtain for our preferences, as a result of each revision.
Other logic program semantics are available too, such as the Revised Stable Model semantics, a two-valued se-
mantics which resolves odd loops over default negation, arising from the unconstrained expression of preferences, by
means of reductio ad absurdum [18]. Indeed, when there are odd loops over default negation in a program, Stable
Model semantics does not afford the program with a semantics.
The LP computational paradigm has afforded us with the wherewithal to enact preferential theory revision, when
the latter is represented by a logic program. We have shown too how this approach thereby provides an attending
implementation.
We surmise that the LP approach merits attention from the community of researchers addressing the issues we have
considered, and that it is a computational paradigm worth considering for the exploration of formal epistemology.
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Appendix A
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following two propositions.
Note first that Σ maps a program Q over L∗ into a program P over L. The abducibles in AQ are represented in L
by domain atoms.
In the following, we call ΦP the set of rules (defining the domain atoms a1, . . . , am over L corresponding to the
abducibles in AQ over L∗) added to P by Σ (condition 3 of Definition 9). By construction of Σ (conditions 3 and 4),
the preference relation < is defined only over the rules in ΦP .
Proposition 1. Let Q be a program over L∗ with abducibles AQ and P = Σ(Q). Let M̂ be a preferred abductive
stable model with hypotheses 1 of P and M a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q. Let ri and
rj be the rules in ΦP defining the abducibles ai and aj in AQ. Then, it holds that:
• M̂ |= nri<nrj iff M |= ai 
 aj ,
• M̂ |= expect(a) iff M |= expect(a),
• M̂ |= expect_not(a) iff M |= expect_not(a)
Proof. Immediate from conditions 1 and 4 of Definition 9. 
Proposition 2. Let Q be a program over L∗ with abduciblesAQ and P = Σ(Q). Let a ∈AQ and ra ∈ P be a domain
rule defining a. Let M̂ be a preferred abductive stable model with hypotheses 1 of P and M a relevant abductive
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ra ∈ Unpref (P, M̂) iff ∃x ∈AQ such that M |= x 
 a, M |= expect(x) and M |= expect_not(x).
Proof. Since the rules in ΦP (by construction of Σ ) are mutually exclusive, the set Unpref (P, M̂) of unpreferred
rules (defined in Definition 5) reduces to:
Unsup(P, M̂) = { },
Unpref (P, M̂) = least(Unsup(P, M̂)∪Q)= least(Q),
where
Q = {r ∈ P : ∃u ∈ (P − Unpref (P, M̂)) such that M̂ |= nu < nr, M̂ |= expect(H(u)) and
M̂ |= expect_not(H(u))}.
(⇒) Assume that ra ∈ Unpref (P, M̂). Then, there must exists a rule u ∈ ΦP such that M̂ |= nu < nra , M̂ |=
expect(H(u)) and M̂ |= expect_not(H(u)). Hence, by Proposition 1, we have that M |= H(u) 
 a, M |= expect(H(u))
and M |= expect_not(H(u)). The result follows by letting x be H(u).
(⇐) Assume that ∃x ∈ AQ such that M |= x 
 a, M |= expect(x) and M |= expect_not(x). Let rx ∈ ΦP be the
rule defining x. Then, by Proposition 1, M̂ |= nrx<nra , M̂ |= expect(x) and M̂ |= expect_not(x), and consequently,
ra ∈ Unpref (P, M̂). In fact,
• if rx ∈ (P − Unpref (P, M̂)), then ra ∈ Unpref (P, M̂) because M̂ |= nrx < nra and M̂ |= B+(rx);
• otherwise (rx /∈ (P − Unpref (P, M̂))), that is rx ∈ Unpref (P, M̂), then there must exists a rule rz preferred to rx
for which M̂ |= B+(rz). By transitivity of <, it holds that M̂ |= nrz<nra and hence ra ∈ Unpref (P, M̂). 
Theorem 1. Let Q be a program over L∗ with abducibles AQ and P = Σ(Q). Then, M̂ is a preferred abductive
stable model with hypotheses 1 of P iff M is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q, where
either
(a) 1 = 2 = { }, or
(b) 1 = {abduce} and 2 = {a}, for some a ∈AQ.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that M̂ is a preferred abductive stable model with hypotheses 1 of P . We have to show that M
is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q, that is, the six conditions of Definition 8 are satisfied.
Conditions:
1. for every x, y ∈AQ, if M |= x 
 y then M |= y 
 x;
2. for every x, y, z ∈AQ, if M |= x 
 y and M |= y 
 z, then M |= x 
 z.
It follows immediately from conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 6 and Proposition 1.
Condition:
3. M = least(Q+ ∪ Default(Q+,M)), with Q+ = Q∪ 2.
To prove the statement we distinguish between two cases depending on whether 1 and 2 are empty sets or
singletons.
Case (a): 1 = 2 = { }.
Since 1 = {}, none of the rules in ΦP is used to compute M̂ , otherwise abduce would belong to 1. Therefore, the
rules in ΦP can be removed from P without affecting its model, that is, M̂ = least(P −ΦP ∪ Default(P −ΦP ,M̂)).
Since M̂ add to M the atom confirm(a), for any a ∈ AQ for which M |= expect(a) and M |= expect_not(a), and
replaces every relevance atom of the form ai 
 aj in M with nri<nrj , by construction of Σ (conditions 1 and 4), we
have that M = least(Q ∪ Default(Q,M)). Finally, being 2 = {}, we have that M = least(Q+ ∪ Default(Q+,M)),
where Q+ = Q∪ 2.
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The domain rules in ΦP are mutually exclusive by construction (Definition 9 condition 4). Therefore, at most one
of the domain atoms corresponding to the abducibles in AQ = {a1, . . . , am} is true in M̂ . Since M̂ |= abduce and
abduce occurs only in the body of the rules in ΦP , exactly one of these rules must have its body true. Let
ai ← abduce,not a1, . . . ,notai−1,not ai+1, . . . ,not am, confirm(ai) (ri)
be such a rule. Hence, from the assumption that M̂ is a preferred abductive stable model, that is, M̂ = least(P+ −
Unpref (P+, M̂)∪ Default(P+, M̂)), with P+ = P ∪1, it follows that M̂ = least(P+ −ΦP ∪ {ai} ∪ Default(P+ −
ΦP ∪ {ai}, M̂)). By Definition 9 (conditions 1, 2 and 4), we have that M = least(Q ∪ {ai} ∪ Default(Q ∪ {ai},M)).
Finally, by letting a be ai , it holds that M = least(Q+ ∪ Default(Q+,M)), with Q+ = Q∪ 2.
Condition:
4. 2 is the empty set or a singleton.
Immediate by noting that the rules in ΦP are mutually exclusive.
Condition:
5. if 2 = {a}, then M |= expect(a) and M |= expect_not(a).
Assume that 2 = {a}, and consequently 1 = {abduce}. Since M̂ |= abduce, abduce occurs only in the body of
the rules in ΦP , and the rules in ΦP are mutually exclusive, then there exists exactly one rule in ΦP with its body
true. Let
ai ← abduce,not a1, . . . ,not ai−1,not ai+1, . . . ,not am, confirm(ai) (ri)
be such a rule. By definition of Σ , the only rule in P defining confirm(ai) is
confirm(ai) ← expect(ai),not expect_not(ai).
Hence, M̂ |= expect(ai) and M̂ |= expect_not(ai) because B+(ri) is true in M̂ ; consequently, by Proposition 1, M |=
expect(ai) and M |= expect_not(ai). The result follows by letting a be ai .
Condition:
6. if 2 = {a}, then there exists no relevance rule r in Q such that:
• H(r) is x 
 a,
• M |= H(r),
• M |= expect(x) and M |= expect_not(x).
Assume that 2 = {a}, and consequently 1 = {abduce}. Hence, by Definition 9, one of the rules in ΦP must have
been used to calculate M̂ . Let ra ∈ ΦP be such a rule. By the definition of preferred abductive stable model, there
exists no rule rx ∈ ΦP such that M̂ |= nrx < nra and M̂ |= B+(rx). Note that, by definition of Σ (conditions 2 and 3),
M̂ |= B+(rx) means that M̂ |= expect(x) and M̂ |= expect_not(x). By Proposition 1, it follows that there exists no
relevance rule r ∈ Q whose head is x 
 a such that M |= x 
 a, M |= expect(x) and M |= expect_not(x).
(⇐) Assume that M is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q. We have to show that M̂ is a
preferred abductive stable model with hypotheses 1 of P , that is, the three conditions of Definition 6 are satisfied.
Conditions:
1. if M̂ |= nr1 < nr2 , then M̂ |= nr2 < nr1 ;
2. if M̂ |= nr1 < nr2 and M̂ |= nr2 < nr3 , then M̂ |= nr1 < nr3 .
It follows immediately from conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 8 and Proposition 1.
Condition:
3. M̂ = least(P+ − Unpref (P+, M̂)∪ Default(P+, M̂)), with P+ = P ∪ 1.
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singletons.
Case (a): 1 = 2 = { }.
Since M is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q, it holds that M = least(Q+ ∪
Default(Q+,M)). Being 2 = { }, it follows that M = least(Q ∪ Default(Q,M)). Since 1 = { }, no atom ai ∈AQ
belongs to the model M̂ of P , that is, no rule in ΦP is used to compute M̂ . By Definition 9 (conditions 1
and 4) and by construction of M̂ , we have that M̂ = least(P ∪ Default(P, M̂)). Since the set of unpreferred rules
Unpref (P, M̂) ⊆ ΦP , it holds that M̂ = least(P − Unpref (P, M̂)∪ Default(P, M̂)). Finally, being 1 = { }, we have
that M̂ = least(P+ − Unpref (P+, M̂)∪ Default(P+, M̂)), where P+ = P ∪ 1.
Case (b): 1 = {abduce} and 2 = {a}, for some a ∈AQ.
Since M is a relevant abductive stable model with hypotheses 2 of Q, it holds that M = least(Q+ ∪
Default(Q+,M)). By Definition 9 and by construction of M̂ , it follows that M̂ = least(P+−ΦP ∪{a}∪Default(P+−
ΦP ∪ {a}, M̂)), with P+ = P ∪1. Let ra ∈ ΦP be the rule defining a. By condition 6 of Definition 8 and by Propo-
sition 1, it follows that there exists no preference rule u such that M̂ |= nu < nra , H(u) is x 
 a, M̂ |= expect(x)
and M̂ |= expect_not(x). Hence, nra ∈ (P+ − Unpref (P+, M̂)). Consequently, M̂ = least(P+ − Unpref (P+, M̂) ∪
Default(P+, M̂)), with P+ = P ∪ 1. 
Theorem 2. Let T be a program over L+ and L a literal. Then T |= L iff Γ (T ) |= L.
Proof. The claim follows by noting that not incorrect(.) and uncovered(.) are true and false in Γ (T ) because incorrect
and uncovered do not occur in T . Therefore, any interpretation M is a stable model of T iff M is a stable model of
Γ (T ). 
Theorem 3. Let T be a program over L+. The pair D = 〈U,I 〉 is a diagnosis for T iff
Z = {uncovered(A): A ∈ U} ∪ {incorrect(A ← Body): A ← Body ∈ I}
is a revision of Γ (T ), where the revisables are literals of the form incorrect(.) and uncovered(.). Furthermore, D is
a minimal diagnosis iff Z is a minimal revision.
Proof. The result follows immediately by noting that adding a positive assumption incorrect(A ← Body) has an effect
similar to removing the rule A ← Body from the program, and adding a positive assumption uncovered(A) makes A
true in the revised program. Hence, the programs T − I ∪U and T ∪Z are equivalent, that is, for every literal L with
L = uncovered(.) and L = incorrect(.), it holds that T − I ∪U |= L iff T ∪Z |= L.
The proof of the minimality condition follows directly by the way D and Z are constructed and by the fact that
every diagnosis has a corresponding revision, and vice versa. 
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